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Transforming Transgender Rights in
Schools: Protection from Discrimination
Under Title IX and the Equal Protection
Clause
Vittoria L. Buzzelli*
ABSTRACT

Claims involving transgender rights are an emerging area of case
law and are beginning to gain significant attention in the U.S. The topic
is of particular importance in schools and universities where transgender
students are repeatedly subject to discrimination with few remedies.
Students determined to be treated in accordance with their gender
identity often request to use the restrooms and locker rooms of the
gender with which they identify.
If the students do so without
permission, the students face punishment, expulsion from school, and
even criminal charges. Although there is little case law on transgender
student rights, most cases to have addressed the issue are flawed.
This Comment analyzes the two most effective avenues of recovery
for transgender students who suffer discrimination: Title IX and the
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University,
2017. I want to thank my family and friends for their encouragement, my law review
editors for their guidance, and my best friend and mentor for supporting me through this
process and always being there to share ideas with.
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Equal Protection Clause, and explains how these laws can afford
protection to transgender students. Additionally, this Comment explains
how transgender discrimination is the same as sex discrimination and
why the terms "sex"
and "gender" should be treated
interchangeably. This Comment also advocates for recognition of
transgender persons as part of the quasi-suspect "gender" class, or for
LGBT persons to be recognized as a quasi-suspect class on their own.
Furthermore, with the ultimate goal of recognizing transgender student
rights and eliminating transgender discrimination, this Comment
recommends that schools replace shared, sex-segregated facilities with
single-user, unisex facilities.
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INTRODUCTION

"The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty
that includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful
realm, to define and express their identity."' "Identity" can refer to a
variety of different things. 2 "Gender identity" refers to a person's selfperceived gender.3 The term is often used in reference to transgender
people-those people "whose gender identity differs from their sex
assigned at birth."4 Transgender people experience "gender dysphoria,"
meaning they transform psychologically and emotionally to a different
sex.5 This change in identity is generally reflected by a transgender
person's appearance and behavior.6 Despite the idea of a constitutional
right to express one's identity, transgender people are often left
wondering-if I part with my old identity, do I part with my rights too?'

1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
2. See Daphna Oyserman et al., Self Self-Concept, and Identity, in HANDBOOK OF
SELF AND IDENTITY 69, 73-74 (Mark R. Leary & June Price Tangney eds., 2012).
3. Gender Identity 101: A Transgender Primer, TGNET ARIZONA, at 4 (19982002), http://www.endabusewi.org/sites/default/files/resources/gender-identity 101_5-05
.pdf [hereinafter Gender Identity 101].
4. Rumble v. Fairview Health Serys., No. 14-cv-2037, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31591, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015) (quoting TRANS BODIES, TRANS SELVES: A
RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 620 (Laura Erickson-Schroth ed., 2014)).

5. See generally Gender Dysphoria, AM. PsYCHiATRIc Ass'N (2013),
http://www.dsm5.org/documents/gender/`20dysphoria%20fact%2Osheet.pdf.
6. GenderIdentity 101, supra note 3, at 4.
7. See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306-07 (D.D.C.
2008)("[I]n cases where the plaintiff has changed her sex . . . courts have traditionally
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Am I prepared to face the "lawful discrimination" that accompanies such
a change?8
Today's transgender youth face particularly difficult challenges at
school.9
In order to be treated consistently with their identity,
transgender students desire access to restrooms and locker rooms of the
sex with which they identify. 10 Peers and school officials often single
out transgender youths by refusing to respect their gender identity and
punishing them for expressing that identity." This type of treatment
leads to discrimination claims.12
Two avenues of recovery for transgender students who are
discriminated against include Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1972"
("Title IX") and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution ("Equal Protection
Clause"). 14
Unfortunately, many courts' holdings suggest that
transgender people are not protected from discrimination per se under
Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause.15 Recently, two federal district

carved such persons out of the [Title VII] statute by concluding that 'transsexuality' is
unprotected.").
8. See Alissa Scheller & Cameron Love, Transgender People Are More Visible
Than Ever, But It's Still Legal To Discriminate Against Them In Most States,
HUFFINGTON POST, (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/03/trans
gender-discrimination-laws n_7502266.html.
9. See The 2013 NationalSchool Climate Survey: Key Findings on the Experiences
of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Youth in Our Nation's Schools, GAY,
LESBIAN AND STRAIGHT EDUCATION NETWORK at 5, (2013) http://www.glsen.org
/article/2013-national-school-climate-survey (reporting that in the prior year, 55.2 percent

of LGBT students were verbally harassed because of their gender expression, 42.2
percent of transgender students were prevented from using their preferred name, 59.2
percent of transgender students were required to use a bathroom or locker room of their
legal sex, and 31.6 percent of transgender students were prevented from wearing clothes

considered inappropriate based on their legal sex).
10.
See Harper Jean Tobin & Jennifer Levi, Article, SecuringEqual Access to SexSegregatedFacilitiesfor Transgender Students, 28 Wis. J.L. GENDER & Soc'Y 301, 301

(2013).
11. See, e.g., G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736, 738-39, 742
(E.D. Va. 2015) (discussing a boy, born female, whose school and community disproved
of him using the men's bathroom); Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth
Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 659, 667 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (discussing a boy,
born female, who was expelled and cited for disorderly conduct for using male facilities);
Doe v. Yunits, 00-1060-A, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 491, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct.
11, 2000) (discussing a girl, born male, who was suspended three times for using the
girls' restroom).

12. See, e.g., Gloucester, 132 F. Supp. at 738-39, 742; Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at
667; Doe, 86 A.3d at 602-04; Yunits, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 491, at *1.
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
15. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F. 3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir. 2007);
Braninburg v. Coalinga State Hosp., No. 1:08-cv-01457-MHM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
127769, at *22 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2012); Jamison v. Davue, No. S-11-cv-2056 WBS,
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court cases addressed transgender student claims under Title IX and the
Equal Protection Clause, both of which denied the claims.16 One of these
cases was reversed on appeal.17
In this Comment's "background section," Part A will focus on the
history of transgender claims under Title VII, which is analogous to Title
IX, and explain the difference between per se sex discrimination and sex
stereotyping. Part B will focus on transgender claims under the Equal
Protection Clause and provide history on the LGBT movement. 9 Part C
will discuss three recent federal court cases involving transgender
student claims under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause.2 0
In the "analysis section," Part A will explain, through the use of
case law and agency decisions, why the statutory term "sex" in Title IX
protects transgender students under both the sex stereotyping theory and
discrimination per se. 21 Part B will examine the criteria for heightened
protection under the Equal Protection Clause and argue that transgender
people should be treated as part of the protected "gender" class, or
alternatively, that LGBT 22 people should be recognized as a quasisuspect class on their own.23 Part C will analyze three important federal
court decisions addressing these specific issues and explain why two of
the courts' reasoning is flawed, including a discussion of the courts'
misinterpretation of the word "sex" and failure to defer to government
agency decisions. 24 Part D will analyze the feasibility of the Department
of Education's ("ED") solution to transgender discrimination in schools
and point out the challenges with implementing that solution. 2 5

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40266, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2012); Lopez v. City of New
York, No. 05-cv-10321-NRB, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7645, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30,
2009).
16. See Gloucester, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 753; Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 683. An
earlier federal case was also decided regarding transgender student rights under Title IX.
See Doe v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 2:06-CV-1074-JCM(RJJ), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
71204, at *9-13 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2008) (holding that Title IX does not entitle
transgender students to access bathrooms based on gender identity). This case touches
only briefly on the arguments recited in this Comment and, therefore, will not be
discussed in full. Id. at *11-13.
17. See G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 727 (4th Cir. 2016).
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See infra Part II.B.
20. See infra Part II.C; Gloucester, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 753; Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d
at 661.
21. See infra Part III.A.
22. LGBT stands for "lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender." See Young v. Giles
Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:15-cv-00107, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170695, at *2 n.2 (M.D.
Tenn. Dec. 22, 2015).
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. See infra Part III.C.
25. See infra Part HI.D.
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Lastly, in the section "recommendation for protecting transgender
students," this Comment will advocate for a new solution where schools
and universities replace their facilities with single-user bathrooms and
locker rooms that are not labeled according to sex.26
II.

THE BACKGROUND OF TRANSGENDER RIGHTS UNDER TITLE IX
AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

A.

The History of TransgenderClaims under Title IX and Title VII

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 states that "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
,,27
As a result, students have an implicit private
financial assistance.
right of action for sex discrimination 2 8 and can bring claims against
certain educational institutions on the theory that the institution
intentionally discriminated against the student on the basis of sex. 2 9 To
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title IX, the student
must allege that: (1) he or she was subjected to discrimination in an
educational program; (2) the program receives federal assistance; and (3)
the discrimination was on the basis of sex.30
While transgender individuals who experience discrimination in
federally funded schools can bring claims under Title IX, 3 1 individuals
can similarly bring claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196432 ("Title VII") for discrimination in the workplace.33 Although
there is a lack of federal case law regarding protection for transgender
students under Title IX, the issue can be analogized to Title VII cases
because both prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. 34

26. See infra Part IV.
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
28. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
29. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
30. Bougher v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 713 F. Supp. 139, 143-44 (W.D. Pa. 1989),
afj'd, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989).
31. See20U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2013).
33. See id.
34. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74 (1992) (relying on
Title VII precedents in recognizing a private cause of action for Title IX sexual
harassment); see also Mabry v. State Bd. of Cmty. Colls. & Occupational Educ., 813
F.2d 311, 315 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987) ("Because Title VII prohibits the identical conduct
prohibited by Title IX, i.e., sex discrimination, we regard it as the most appropriate
analogue when defining Title IX's substantive standards . . . .").
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"Sex Stereotyping" Versus Per Se Protection

Under Title VII, most courts have found that transgender people are
protected only on the basis of sex stereotyping, not because they are a
protected class per se.35 The gender stereotyping theory comes from the
case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,36 in which the U.S. Supreme Court
found that evidence of sex stereotyping was sufficient to satisfy Title
VII's "because of sex" requirement.3 7
In Price Waterhouse, a female manager sued her employer when
her bid for partnership was rejected, claiming gender discrimination
because the other partners said that she was too "macho" and should act
more feminine. The Court found that these comments were evidence of
sex stereotyping and held that a plaintiff can rely on this kind of gender
stereotyping evidence to show Title VII discrimination.3 9
According to the Fifth Circuit, although the Price Waterhouse
plaintiff was not transgender, the case established a vehicle for
transgender people to seek Title VII recovery by establishing that the
"because of sex" requirement can be satisfied with evidence of a
plaintiffs perceived failure to conform to traditional gender
stereotypes. 4 0 Although Price Waterhouse allows transgender persons to
recover under the gender stereotyping theory if they are discriminated
against for not acting feminine or masculine enough, most federal courts
have held that discrimination based on transgender status alone is not
actionable under Title VII. 41 These courts interpreted the word "sex" in
Title VII to only prohibit discrimination against someone for being a
man or woman. 4 2

&

35. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007);
Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1000 (N.D. Ohio 2003), af'd, 98 F.
App'x 461 (6th Cir. 2004); Eure v. Sage Corp., 61 F. Supp. 3d 651, 660-63 (W.D. Tex.
2014).
36. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989).
37. Id. at 235.
38. Id. at 228, 251.
39. Id. at 235.
40. EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 454 (5th Cir. 2013).
41. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221-22 (10th Cir.
2007); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v.
Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging
Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 658 (S.D. Tex. 2008); Sweet v. Mulberry
Lutheran Home, No. IP02-0320-C-H/K, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11373, at *2 (S.D. Ind.
June 6, 2003).
42. See, e.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 ("The phrase in Title VII prohibiting
discrimination based on sex, in its plain meaning, implies that it is unlawful to
discriminate against women because they are women and against men because they are
men.").
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However, some decisions have come to the opposite conclusion.
Discrimination based on one's transsexuality 43 was addressed in the D.C.
district court decision Schroerv. Billington," in which the court held that
an employer's revocation of a job offer because the applicant transitioned
from male to female was discrimination per se in violation of Title VII. 45
Contrary to most courts, the Schroer court reasoned that apart from
stereotyping, refusing to hire someone because the person changes his or
her sex is sex discrimination because doing so targets that person
"because of sex."46
The Sixth Circuit used a different line of reasoning in Smith v. City
of Salem,4 7 which involved a firefighter, born male, who was terminated
after informing her employer that she was transitioning genders and
would begin coming to work as a woman.4 8 The court held that the
plaintiff had stated a valid employment discrimination claim under Title
VII and, ultimately, the Equal Protection Clause. 49 The court reasoned
that "[s]ex stereotyping based on a person's gender non-conforming
behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that
behavior." 50
Thus, the court may have been suggesting that
discrimination against someone for being a transgender person is itself
sex stereotyping.5 1
The gender stereotyping reasoning has influenced a few courts to
adopt the same approach under Title IX, but the approach has generally
been limited to harassment claims. 52 For example, in Montgomery v.
43. The term "transsexual" refers to someone who underwent surgery to physically
transform from one sex to another. See Transsexual, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transsexual (last visited Mon. Aug. 22,
2016). However, because "transsexual" is encompassed within the term "transgender,"
the terms will be used synonymously for purposes of this Comment. See GLAAD Media
Reference Guide- TransgenderIssues, GAY & LESBIAN ALLIANCE AGAINST DEFAMATION,
http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender (explaining that "transgender" is "[a]n
umbrella term").
44. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008).
45. Id. at 305.
46. Id.
47. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
48. Id. at 575.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011), for the idea that
"the very acts that define transgender people as transgender are those that contradict
stereotypes of gender-appropriate appearance and behavior."
52. See, e.g., Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d 135, 151
(N.D.N.Y. 2011); Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1151 n.1
(E.D. Cal. 2011); Doe v. Brimfield Grade Sch., 552 F. Supp. 2d 816, 822-23 (C.D. Ill.,
2008); Seiwert v. Spencer-Owen Cmty. Sch. Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 942, 953 (S.D. Ind.
2007); Theno v. Tonganoxic Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 963 (D.
Kan. 2005).
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Independent School District,53 the court found that students tormenting
another male student based on his feminine personality traits, and on the
perception that he did not engage in behaviors fitting a male, was
prohibited harassment under Title IX.54
2.

Administrative Decisions

Although case law is lacking, there have been some administrative
decisions regarding transgender discrimination per se.ss In 2012, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") found per se
discrimination based on transgender status to be actionable under Title
VII. 56 The EEOC held that discrimination against an individual because
that person is transgender is discrimination because of sex and is
therefore prohibited under Title VII. 7

In 2014, the ED issued policy

guidance stating that Title IX's sex discrimination prohibition extends to
claims of "discrimination based on a student's gender identity."5 The
ED reaffirmed this statement in a Dear Colleague Letter issued in 2016.59
The ED applied their definition of the word "sex" in a recent
investigation at Township High School District 211 in Illinois. 60 Here,
the ED found that the school district violated Title IX's prohibition
against sex discrimination by refusing to allow a transgender student who
identifies as female to access the girls' locker room.6 ' The student stated

that being required to use separate facilities ostracized her, caused her to

53.
54.
55.
Nov. 2,
2012).
56.
57.
IX

Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090 (D. Minn. 2000).
Id.
See, e.g., Twp. High Sch. Dist. 211, OCR Case No. 05-14-1055 (Dep't of Educ.
2015); Macy v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 at 1 (Apr. 20,
Macy, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 at 1.
Id. at 14.

DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CrvIL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE
58.
[hereinafter QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS],
(2014)
AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE,

http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf.
59. See Catherine E. Lhamon & Vanita Gupta, Joint "Dear Colleague" Letter, U.S.
DEP'T. OF EDUC. & U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. (May 13, 2016), http://www2.ed.gov/about

/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ix-transgender.pdf. Recently, however, 11
states sued the federal government to overturn the Dear Colleague Letter and a federal
judge blocked the letter by issuing a preliminary injunction in favor of the states. Tom
Benning, Federal Judge, Siding With Texas, Blocks Obama's Rules on Bathrooms for
Transgender Students, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.
dallasnews.com/news/politics/headlines/20160822-federal-judge-siding-with-texasblocks-federal-transgender-rules-for-schools.ece.
60. See Twp. High Sch. Dist. 211, OCR Case No. 05-14-1055 9 (Dep't of Educ.
Nov. 2, 2015).
61. Id.
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be tardy for gym class, and excluded her from activities planned by
students in the locker room.

62

The ED concluded that the student was not afforded the opportunity
to participate equally in a school program because she was forced to
change in a separate bathroom. 63 The ED stated that the school should
allow the transgender student to change in the girls' locker room and that
the other students' interests could be accommodated by providing
additional privacy curtains to keep their bodies from being exposed to
others.M
While these administrative decisions demonstrate victories for
transgender persons, the decisions are not necessarily binding on
courts. 61 Courts will only accord deference to a federal agency's
interpretation of a statute that an agency is responsible for administering
when the statute is ambiguous and the agency's interpretation is based on
a "permissible construction of the statute."6 However, these decisions
are an important step towards recognizing transgender student rights
under Title IX.
B.

The History of-Transgenderand LGBT Claims under the Equal
Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause states: "No State shall . .. deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."67 Equal
protection is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike.
When reviewing a claim that state action violates the Equal
Protection Clause, a court must first determine the correct standard of
review.69 The highest standard, "strict judicial scrutiny," is used for two
types of cases: those involving laws that operate to the disadvantage of
suspect classes and those that interfere with the exercise of fundamental
rights.70 To survive strict judicial scrutiny, a law or regulation must
advance a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to meet that
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. Similarly, in 2013, the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") required the Arcadia
Unified School District to give a transgender boy access to male locker rooms and
restrooms. Arcadia Unified Sch. Dist., OCR Case No. 09-12-1020 3 (Dep't of Educ. July
24, 2013).
65. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
66. Id. at 843.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
68. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
69. See Donatelli v. Mitchell, 2 F.3d 508, 513 (3d Cir. 1993).
70. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
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interest.7 1 If the strict judicial scrutiny standard does not apply, the
"rational basis test" is normally used, meaning the law must rationally
further a legitimate state interest. 72
Somewhere in between the rational basis test and strict judicial
scrutiny, courts have applied another standard of review known as
"intermediate scrutiny." 7 3 Intermediate scrutiny is typically used to
review laws that affect "quasi-suspect" classes, such as gender.7 4 Under
this test, the proffered justification for a law or regulation that
distinguishes based on gender, for example, must be "exceedingly
persuasive," 75 and the discriminatory classification must be substantially
related to an important government purpose.76
1.
Glenn v. Brumby and Smith v. City of Salem: Transgender
Persons are Part of the "Gender" Classification
The U.S. Supreme Court applies intermediate scrutiny to sex-based
classifications in order to "eliminate discrimination on the basis of
However, most federal courts have held that
gender stereotypes."
transgender people are excluded from this protection and that
transgender people are not a suspect class under the Equal Protection
Clause. In contrast, the Sixth Circuit in Smith and the Eleventh Circuit
in Glenn v. Brumby 7 9 determined that transgender people are part of the
protected gender class, just like non-transgender men and women.80
In Smith, a transgender plaintiff successfully brought a Title VII sex
discrimination claim, which also constituted an equal protection claim,
when she was forced to resign from her job after being diagnosed with
gender identity disorder and coming to work as a woman." The Sixth

-

71. Donatelli, 2 F.3d at 513.
72. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. at 17.
73. See Clark v. Jeter, 468 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
74. Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
75. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
76. Id. (citing Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)); City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
77. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011) (consolidating sexbased discrimination cases).
78. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F. 3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir. 2007);
Gomez v. Maass, 918 F.2d 181, 181 (9th Cir. 1990); Braninburg v. Coalinga State Hosp.,
No. 1:08-cv-01457-MHM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127769, at *22 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7,
2012); Jamison v. Davue, No. S-1 1-cv-2056 WBS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40266, at *10
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2012); Lopez v. City of New York, No. 05-cv-10321-NRB, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7645, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009).
79. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).
80. Id. at 1319.
81. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2004).
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Circuit reasoned that discrimination against someone for being a
transsexual is sex stereotyping, and individuals have a right under the
Equal Protection Clause to be free from discrimination on the basis of
sex.82

Similarly, in Glenn, a transgender female brought a claim alleging
sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause when she
was terminated from job.83 Although the defendant employer asserted
that the plaintiff was fired because other employees threatened to sue
over the plaintiffs use of the women's restroom, there was no evidence
that this was the defendant's true motivation.84
Relying on Price Waterhouse and other Title VII precedent, the
Glenn court held that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff
based on sex by terminating her for transitioning from male to
female.85 The court reasoned that discrimination based on a transgender
person's gender nonconformity 86 is itself sex discrimination that violates
the Equal Protection Clause.8 ' The court further held that discrimination
based on sex stereotypes is subject to intermediate scrutiny.
The Glenn court reasoned that a person is considered transgender
"precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior transgresses
gender stereotypes." 89 As a result, there is a "congruence" between
discrimination against transgender individuals and discrimination on the
basis of "gender-based behavioral norms." 90 Thus, transgender
individuals must be afforded the same protection against discrimination
based on sex stereotypes as everyone else because the nature of the
discrimination is the same.91
2.

The LGBT Movement Towards Equality

An examination of the LGB 9 2 Rights Movement may provide
insight into the future of LGBT rights collectively and, specifically,

82. Id.
83. Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1314.
84. Id. at 1321.
85. Id.
86. "Gender nonconformity" refers to a person identifying as a gender different
from that person's biological sex; for example, a biological man who identifies as a
woman. See id. at 1317, 1320-21.
87. Id. at 1317.
88. Id. at 1319.
89. Id. at 1316.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1318.
92. "LGB" stands for Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual. See M.V. Lee Badgett et al.,
Bias in the Workplace: Consistent Evidence of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Discrimination,84 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 559, 561 (2009).
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transgender equal protection.9 3 Equal protection claims have historically
been premised on a person's identity rather than particular acts or
practices.94 In fact, the Civil Rights Movement began on the premise
that race is an immutable characteristic and racial categories are rooted in
biological differences, and as a result, a person should not be treated
differently because of that person's race.95
Other groups seeking
protection from discrimination, such as gay and lesbian persons,
similarly adopted the argument that a person should not be treated
differently based on biological, immutable differences. 96
In accordance with this idea of equality, several federal courts have
held that gay and lesbian persons compose a quasi-suspect class,
receiving heightened protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.9 7 For
example, the Ninth Circuit held that since sexual orientation and sexual
identity are essential to one's identity, a person should not have to
abandon them.98 These findings may affect transgender people's status
because some of the decisions specifically address gender identity, and
because sexual minorities are closely associated and often considered
collectively as "LGBT.
Cases involving sexual orientation have been progressive, resulting
in greater victories for plaintiffs that reflect society's increasingly liberal
views in this area.1" In 1971, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a
93.

See

SHANNON PRICE MINTER, Do TRANSSEXUALS

DREAM OF GAY RIGHTS?

&

GETTING REAL ABOUT TRANSGENDER INCLUSION (Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juana,

Shannon Price Miller eds., 2006) (discussing the historical interdependence of
transgender, lesbian, bisexual, and gay communities).
94. See Remarks at a Reception Honoring Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
Pride Month, I PUB. PAPERS 927, 928 (June 29, 2009) ("We seek an America in which no
one feels the pain of discrimination based on who you are . . . .").
95.

See JOHN D. SKRENTNY, AFTER CIL

RIGHTS: RACIAL REALISM IN THE NEW

AMERICAN WORKPLACE 4 (2014) (discussing the liberal view of immutable differences as

institutionalized in American civil rights law).
96. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646,
649 (2001) (arguing that immutability can be a great force in winning the fight for sexual
minorities).
97. See, e.g., Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000),
overruled in part on other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th
Cir. 2005); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 430 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Golinski v.
U.S. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989-90 (N.D. Cal. 2012);
Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 333 (D. Conn. 2012).
98. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093.
99. See MINTER, supra note 93 (discussing the historical interdependence of LGBT
communities). However, transgender status in no way indicates a person's sexual
orientation. See Definition of Terms: Sex, Gender, Gender Identity, Sexual Orientation,
in The Guidelinesfor PsychologicalPractice with Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Clients,
AM.

PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N

(February

18-20,

2011),

http://www.apa.org/pi/Igbt/

resources/sexuality-definitions.pdf [hereinafter Definition of Terms].
100. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Windsor v. United States,
699 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2012).
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statute denying marriage to same-sex couples.)o' In 1986, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld a law banning sodomy, holding that the law had a
rational basis. 102 This trend changed in 1996 when the U.S. Supreme
Court found no rational basis for legislation banning Colorado cities
from extending anti-discrimination legislation to gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals.1 0 3 In 2003, the Court expanded gay rights by finding that
same-sex couples have the fundamental right to private intimate
relations.14 Then, in 2013, the Court held that section three of The
Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), 0 5 which stated that the federal
government would not recognize same-sex marriages, was
unconstitutional.'0
Finally, in 2015, the Supreme Court held in Obergefell v. Hodgeso
that marriage is a fundamental right and to deny this right to same-sex
couples is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 08 In doing so, the
Court recognized that sexual orientation is an immutable
characteristic. 0 9 Importantly, gender identity is also immutable. 1' 0
Thus, the reasoning in Obergefell may serve to expand the rights of
transgender people as well."'

101. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971).
102. The court found sentiments against the "morality of homosexuality" to be a
rational basis. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
103. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
104. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). This holding is limited to adult,
consensual behavior. Id. at 567.
105. DOMA § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
106. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
107. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
108. Id. at 2604-05.
109. Id. at 2596 ("[S]exual orientation is both a normal expression of human
sexuality and immutable.").
110. See Hemandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1092 (2000) (finding a man's
female sexual identity to be immutable because it is a trait that one "cannot change, or
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or
consciences").
111. See Wilson v. Phoenix House, 978 N.Y.S.2d 748, 756 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)
("[A]cknowledgement that gender [identity] is immutable and not chosen is more likely
to result in decisions that do find discrimination."); see also Norsworthy v. Beard, 74 F.
Supp. 3d 1100, 1117 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ("The Ninth Circuit's conclusion that
heightened scrutiny should be applied to Equal Protection claims involving
discrimination based on sexual orientation ... applies with at least equal force to
discrimination against transgender people, whose identity is equally immutable . . . .").
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Federal Case Law RegardingTransgenderStudent Protections
under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause

1. Johnston v. University of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth
System of Higher Education
Two important federal cases were recently decided in the context of
transgender student rights under Title IX and the Equal Protection
Clause.1 12 At the district court level, both courts ruled against the
plaintiff students.1 13 However, one of these cases was reversed on
appeal. 114
In March 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania decided Johnston v. University of Pittsburgh of the
Commonwealth System of Higher Education.1 15 The court held that
"transgender" is not a protected characteristic under Title IX and that
transgender people are not a protected class under the Equal Protection
Clause." 6
The Johnston case arose from a student's allegation that his college
discriminated against him based on his sex and transgender status by
prohibiting him from using male-segregated locker rooms and
restrooms.117 When the student continued to use the male' facilities
where he felt most comfortable, the university called the police, who
cited the student for disorderly conduct, and eventually, expelled him
from the university." The court ruled that a federally funded university
does not violate Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause by prohibiting a
transgender male student from using male-designated restrooms and
locker rooms. 1 9
The Johnston court determined that the claim failed under the Equal
Protection Clause because transgender people are not a recognized
protected class, and other students' privacy interests provides a rational

112. See G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736 (E.D. Va. 2015);
Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97 F. Supp.
3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015). Another earlier federal case addressed a transgender student's
Title IX claim, but only briefly touched on the arguments set forth in this Comment. See
Doe v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 206-cv-1074-JCM-RJJ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71204,
at *9-13 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2008) (arguing primarily that a bathroom is not an "education
program" under Title IX).
113. Gloucester, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 753; Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 683.
114. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 727 (4th Cir. 2016).
115. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97
F. Supp. 3d 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
116. Id. at 668-69, 674.
117. Id. at 661.
118. Id at 664.
119. Id. at 669, 672, 681-82.
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basis for separate facilities.1 2 0 The court, citing several cases, also found
transgender individuals to be an unprotected class under Title IX.121 The
1984 case Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.122 was a primary focus in this
decision and held that Title VII affords no protection to transgender
victims of sex discrimination. 12 3 The Ulane court also stated that if the
term "sex" was to mean more than biological male or female, the new
definition would have to come from Congress. 124 The Johnston court
ultimately chose to adopt this narrow meaning of the statutory term
"sex," limited only to biological sex, because Title IX's original purpose
was to establish equal educational opportunities for women and men.1 25
2.

G. G. v. Gloucester County School Board in Virginia

In September 2015, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia decided G. G. v. Gloucester County School Board.12 6 In
Gloucester, G.G., the plaintiff student, challenged a school policy that
limited students' restroom and locker room access to facilities
corresponding with their biological sex and provided students with
"gender identity issues" alternative, private facilities.1 27 In accordance
with the policy, the school installed three unisex, single-stall
restrooms. 128 G.G., who identified as a male, preferred to use the male
facilities and felt stigmatized and humiliated when forced to use
alternative restrooms. 129
The Gloucester court ruled that the student was not protected under
Title IX because one of Title IX's provisions states that recipients are
allowed to provide separate restrooms and locker rooms for students
according to sex.1 30 In coming to this decision, the court acknowledged

&

120. Id. at 669-70.
121. Id. at 674 (citing Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F. 3d 1215, 1221-22 (10th
Cir. 2007); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v.
Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging
Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 658 (S.D. Tex. 2008)); see also Doe v. Clark
Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 206-cv-1074-JCM-RJJ, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71204, at *12-13 (D.
Nev. Sept. 17, 2008) (stating that discrimination "because of sex" only includes
discrimination for being or acting like a male or female).
122. Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
123. See id at 1081.
124. Id. at 1081, 1085-87.
125. See Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 677 (citing Lothes v. Butler Cty. Juvenile
Rehab. Ctr., 243 F. App'x 950, 955 (6th Cir. 2007).
126. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp. 3d 736 (E.D. Va. 2015).
127. Id. at 740.
128. Id. at 741.
129. Id. at 749.
130. Id. at 744, 746; see 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (2015) ("A recipient may provide
separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities
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the ED's interpretation of this provision,1 3 1 issued in a letter in 2015,
which states:
The Department's Title IX regulations permit schools to provide sexsegregated restrooms, locker rooms, shower facilities, housing,
athletic teams, and single-sex classes under certain circumstances.
When a school elects to separate or treat students differently on the
basis of sex in those situations, a school must treat transgender
students consistent with their gender identity.132
However, the court did not give deference to the letter because the
letter's interpretation seemingly based restroom access only on genderidentity, which was erroneous and inconsistent with Title IX.133
Therefore, the regulation was given deference, meaning the school could
separate bathrooms based on biological sex and prevent G.G. from
accessing male facilities.1 34 Furthermore, the court found that the other
students' fundamental right to privacyl 35 outweighed G.G.'s interests.1 36
For these reasons, the court concluded that the school's policy did not
violate Title IX and did not rule on the Equal Protection claim.1 3 7
3.
Reversing Gloucester: The Fourth Circuit Becomes the First
Federal Court to Rule in Favor of Transgender Bathroom Rights
The district court's decision in Gloucester was appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which handed down its decision
on April 19, 2016.138 In G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board,139 the
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of G.G.'s Title IX
claim and remanded for further proceedings because the district court did
not accord appropriate deference to the ED's interpretation of its
regulation.1 40 Specifically, the court held that the ED's regulation was
ambiguous, the ED's interpretation of the relevant Title IX provision was
not inconsistent or erroneous, and the ED's interpretation was the result
of the agency's fair and considered judgment.141
provided for students of one sex shall be comparable to such facilities provided for
students of the other sex.").
131. Gloucester, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 744.
132. Letter from James A. Ferg-Cadima, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy,
Office for Civil Rights, to Emily T. Prince, Esq. (Jan. 7, 2015) (emphasis added).
133. Gloucester, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 746.
134. Id.
135. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
136. Gloucester, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 752-53.
137. Id. at 753.
138. See G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 727 (4th Cir. 2016).
139. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016).
140. Id. at 715.
141. Id. at 720-24.
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The decision came in the middle of a national debate over Title IX
and gender identity and was considered a huge victory for transgender
rights. 142 This case was the first time a United States court held that Title
IX protects the rights of transgender students to use the bathroom that
corresponds with their gender identity.1 4 3
III. ANALYSIS OF TRANSGENDER STUDENT RIGHTS UNDER TITLE IX
AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

A.

TransgenderStudents Should be ProtectedfromDiscrimination
under Title IX

Discrimination "on the basis of sex" should include discrimination
on the basis of gender identity. There is a valid avenue of recovery for
transgender students under both the sex stereotyping theory and the
theory that gender is encompassed in the definition of the word "sex."
1.
The Sixth Circuit and D.C. District Court Got it Right:
Discrimination Based on Sex Stereotyping is Discrimination Against
Someone for Being a Transgender Person
Some courts have extended protection to transgender students under
the "sex stereotyping" framework from the Title VII cases. 1" However,
this protection should not be limited to discrimination based on what was
previously understood as non-conformance to sex stereotypes.1 4 5 Rather,
the protection should extend to discrimination against someone for
simply being a transgender person.
In Smith, the Sixth Circuit found that discrimination against a
transsexual plaintiff is the same as discrimination against the Price
Waterhouse plaintiff, a non-transgender female who did not act in
142. Richard Fausset, Appeals Court Favors Transgender Student in Virginia
Restroom Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 19, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/20
/us/appeals-court-favors-transgender-student-in-virginia-restroom-case.html?r-0.
143. Id. Unfortunately, a divided Supreme Court agreed to block the Fourth Circuit's
order until the Court can consider a petition for a writ of certiorari. See Gloucester Cty.
Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 136 S. Ct. 2442, 2442 (2016).
144. See, e.g., Pratt v. Indian River Cent. Sch. Dist., 803 F. Supp. 2d 135, 151
(N.D.N.Y. 2011); Walsh v. Tehachapi Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1151 n.1
(E.D. Cal. 2011); Doe v. Brimfield Grade Sch., 552 F. Supp. 2d 81(, 822-23 (C.D. Ill.
2008); Seiwert v. Spencer-Owen Comm. Sch. Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 942, 953 (S.D. Ind.
2007); Theno v. Tonganoxic Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 963 (D.
Kan. 2005).
145. In other words, the protection should extend to circumstances beyond just those
involving people who do not behave or appear sufficiently feminine or masculine. See
Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that one can
generally fail to conform to gender stereotypes either through behavior or through
appearance).
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accordance with "typical" female traits, because both involve
stereotyping someone based on their gender non-conforming behavior. 146
The label "transsexual" should not destroy a sex discrimination claim. 147
Concluding that "gender non-conformance" includes being a transgender
person is logical because, by definition, a transgender person does not
conform to the sex that person was assigned to at birth. 148
In Schroer, the D.C. District Court explained through an analogy
why this approach makes sense:
Imagine that an employee is fired because she converts from
Christianity to Judaism. Imagine too that her employer testifies that
he harbors no bias toward either Christians or Jews but only
"converts." That would be a clear case of discrimination "because of
religion," . . . [which] easily encompasses discrimination because of a
change of religion. But in cases where the plaintiff has changed her
sex, and faces discrimination because of the decision to stop
presenting as a man and to start appearing as a woman, courts have
traditionally carved such persons out of the statute by concluding that
"transsexuality" is unprotected by Title VII. In other words, courts
have allowed their focus on the label "transsexual" to blind them to
the statutory language itself.149
Furthermore, applying the gender-stereotyping model only to the
actions of transgender individuals, such as the way they walk, talk, or
dress, rather than their identity as transgender persons, would be
fundamentally unfair. Such an application would force transgender
persons to "sacrifice [their] transgender identity" by filing claims based
on how they act, rather than who they are. 5 o Therefore, discrimination
against someone for being a transgender person is sex stereotyping and is
grounds for a discrimination claim "because of sex."

146.

Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004).

147. Id. at 575.
148. See Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-cv-2037, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31591, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015) ("[Transgender] may be used to describe
people .. . whose gender identity is different from their sex assigned at birth.") (citing
TRANS BODIES, TRANS SELVES: A RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 620
(Laura Erickson-Schroth ed., 2014)).
149. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306-07 (D.D.C. 2008) (emphasis
added).
150. Jason Lee, Lost in Transition: The Challenges of Remedying Transgender
Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 423, 445-46
(2012).
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2.
The EEOC and the ED Make it Simpler: "Gender" is Included
in the Definition of the Word "Sex"
The sex stereotyping theory would be unnecessary if transgender
students were protected per se under Title IX. Transgender should be a
protected characteristic per se under Title IX because gender identity is
encompassed in the word "sex." Unlike sex stereotyping, this bright-line
rule is easier for courts to apply and will more genuinely depict the
claims at issue."'
The issue with the word "sex" is that, scientifically speaking, sex
refers to the biological difference between males and females, while
gender refers to the feeling of identifying and acting as either male or
female. 152 For statutory purposes, however, "sex" and "gender" are
synonymous. 15 3
While several courts have incorrectly barred
discrimination based only on the scientific definition of the word "sex,"
the Eleventh Circuit, the EEOC, and the ED agree that gender is included
in the word "sex" as used in Title VII and Title IX.
The ED stated in a letter that Title IX's definition of "sex" also
extends to gender identity.1 s 4 The EEOC agreed, explaining that any sort
of transgender discrimination is sex discrimination because it inherently
involves taking sex into account.155 This interpretation of the word "sex"
is favorable because it supports the statutory purpose of barring
discrimination,1 s6 aligns with Title IX's broad scope, 157 and provides a
simpler framework for courts to apply. For example, in Macy v.
Department of Justice,15 8 the EEOC determined that the claim was
mistakenly separated into several claims, including "discrimination based
on sex," "sex stereotyping," "gender transition/change of sex," "gender
151. See Joanna Grossman, The EEOC Rules That Transgender Discrimination is
Sex Discrimination: The Reasoning Behind that Decision, JUSTIA, May 1, 2012,
https://verdict.justia.com/2012/05/01/the-eeoc-rules-that-transgender-discrimination-issex-discrimination.
152. See Definition of Terms, supra note 99.
153. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[F]or Title VII
purposes, the terms 'sex' and 'gender' have become interchangeable.").
154. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 58.
155. Macy v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (Apr. 20, 2012) ("As
used in Title VII, the term 'sex' 'encompasses both sex - that is, the biological difference
between men and women - and gender."') (quoting Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1202).
156. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979) ("Title IX, like its model
Title VI, sought . . . to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory
practices . .. [and] provide individual citizens effective protection against those
practices.").
157. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966) ("[Ilf we are to give [Title
IX] the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its
language.").
158. Macy v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (Apr. 20, 2012).
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identity," and "gender identity stereotyping."l59 Each of these confusing
formulations was simply a different way of stating a claim based on
sex.160 Filing a sex discrimination claim would have been appropriate
and much simpler.
3.
The EEOC and ED's Interpretations of the Word "Sex"
Should be Given Chevron Deference
A court will generally accord deference to a federal agency's
interpretation of a statute that the agency is responsible for administering
when "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue" and "the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute." 16 1 The agency's interpretation does not need to be the
only or most reasonable interpretation, just a reasonable interpretation of
the statute in general. 16 2
The ED is the relevant agency in interpreting Title IX because the
ED adopted the regulations upon the agency's establishment in 1979.163
Also, Title IX is ambiguous because the statute does not define the word
"sex." 1 6 Confusion exists regarding whether the word "sex" includes
"gender."l 65
The ED's decision that the terms "sex" and "gender" are
interchangeable is reasonable because the terms are closely intertwined
and because transgender status derives from a person's sex, or, more
specifically, a change of sex. 166 Furthermore, a statute is best interpreted
by the agency that administers the statute. 167 Therefore, courts should
defer to the ED's decision that "gender" is included in the term "sex,"
and transgender people should be protected from discrimination per se
under Title IX.

159. Macy, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, at 3-5, 13.
160. Id. at 13.
161. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
162. Id. at 843-44.
163. See Department of Education Organization Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-88, §
201, 93 Stat. 668, 671 (1979).
164. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
165. See Milton Diamond, Sex and Gender are Diferent: Sexual Identity and Gender
Identity are Different, 7 CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 320, 320 (2002).
166. See Transgender FAQ, GAY & LESBIAN ALLIANCE AGAINST DEFAMATION,
http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender ("Transgender. is a term used to describe
people . .. whose sex they were assigned at birth and .. . own internal gender identity do
not match.") (emphasis added).
167. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretationby Agencies, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAw 285, 292-93 (Daniel A. Farber & Joseph
O'Connell eds., 2010) (stating that an agency may have "information advantages" over a
court about the connection between interpretive choices and actual outcomes).
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TransgenderPersons Should be Protectedas a Quasi-Suspect Class
under the Equal Protection Clause

Although most courts do not recognize transgender individuals as a
protected class,168 transgender persons should be protected from sex
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. Transgender people
should be part of both the "gender" classification, which is a quasisuspect class, 16 9 and the LGBT class, which has not yet acquired
protected status but should be treated as quasi-suspect. Courts should
provide one avenue, or both, for transgender plaintiffs to obtain relief
from discrimination.
1.
Glenn and Smith: Transgender Persons are Part of the
"Gender" Classification
Transgender people should be included in the "gender" class, which
is a quasi-suspect class under the Fourteenth Amendment. 170 While most
courts apply the gender class only to the categories of biological males
and females,171 the class should also include transgender people because
the discrimination they suffer is based on their gender identity.172
The Supreme Court's purpose in applying intermediate scrutiny to
sex-based classifications is to eliminate discrimination based on gender
stereotypes. 173
Protecting transgender people from discrimination
comports with this purpose because a person who is transgender, by
definition, contradicts gender stereotypes by failing to conform to the sex
that person was assigned at birth.17 4

168. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F. 3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir. 2007);
Gomez v. Maass, 918 F.2d 181, 181 (9th Cir. 1990); Braninburg v. Coalinga State Hosp.,
No. 1:08-cv-01457-MHM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127769, at *22 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7,
2012); Jamison v. Davue, No. S-1 1-cv-2056 WBS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40266, at *10
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2012); Lopez v. City of New York, No. 05-cv-10321-NRB, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7645, at *39 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009).
169. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976); Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 733 (1982).
170. See Boren, 429 U.S. at 210; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 733.
171. See, e.g., Boren, 429 U.S. at 210; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 733.
172. See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306-07 (D.D.C. 2008)
(explaining that discrimination because of a change in sex is sex discrimination).
173. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Hogan, 458
U.S. at 726 (explaining the purpose of heightened scrutiny as ensuring that sex-based
classifications rest upon "reasoned analysis rather than . . traditional, often inaccurate,
assumptions about the proper roles of men and women").
174. See Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-cv-2037, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31591, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015) ("[Transgender] may be used to describe people
whose gender expression does not conform to cultural norms and/or whose gender
identity is different from their sex assigned at birth.") (citing TRANs BODIEs, TRANS
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The Eleventh Circuit and the Sixth Circuit support this position.17 5
In Smith, the Sixth Circuit found that discrimination based on the
plaintiffs transsexualism was discrimination based on that person's
failure to conform to sex stereotypes by "expressing a less masculine[]
and more feminine appearance." 7 6 Similarly, in Glenn, a transgender
woman succeeded in her equal protection claim when she was fired for
transitioning from male to female.1 77 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
discrimination against transgender individuals and discrimination on the
basis of "gender-based behavioral norms" are essentially one and the
same. 77 The Glenn court further reasoned that discrimination against
someone for being a transgender person is due to traditional beliefs that
men and women should act a certain way and conform to their birth-sex,
which is gender stereotyping.1 7 9
Therefore, discrimination based on a person's gender nonconformity or transgender status should be subject to intermediate
judicial scrutiny like discrimination based on one's status as a man or
woman. This means that such discrimination must serve important
governmental objectives and the discriminatory means used must be
substantially related to achieving those objectives.' 80
2.

The LGBT Community as a Protected Class

LGBT persons should be recognized as a quasi-suspect class.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, two circuit
courts have held that classifications based on sexual orientation are
subject to heightened scrutiny.' 8' Also, society has demonstrated an
increasing interest in protecting the LGBT community in recent years,

(Laura Erickson-Schroth
ed., 2014)).
175. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004); Glenn, 663 F.3d
at 1313-14.
176. Smith, 378 F.3d at 572.
177. Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1313-14.
178. Id. at 1316.
179. See id. at 1316-17; see also Rosa v. West Bank & Tr. Co. 214 F.3d 213, 215-16
(1st Cir. 2000) (holding that a transgender plaintiff could state a claim under the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act for being denied a loan application because of her feminine
attire); see also Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1198-1203 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that a transgender plaintiff could state a claim under the Gender Motivated Violence Act
for discrimination stemming from her presentation as a woman).
180. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980).
181. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 484 (9th Cir.
2014); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2012).
SELVES: A RESOURCE FOR THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 620
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particularly gays and lesbians.' 82 This is legally significant because the
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that "new insights and societal
understandings can reveal unjustified inequality,"'8 ' and public support
can make it easier for the Court to pass policy-based decisions. 84
Although transgender individuals' concerns have not been widely
recognized,' 8 5 courts' responses to the gay rights movement can provide
guidance on the transgender movement because the two are closely
related.1 8 6
LGBT people likely meet the criteria for a quasi-suspect class. The
Supreme Court has identified two factors that must be met for a group to
be accorded protected status: (1) the group must have suffered a history
of purposeful unequal treatment,' 87 and (2) the group members'
distinguishing characteristic must bear no relation to the members'
ability to perform or contribute to society.188 The Court has also cited
two other considerations that, in a given case, may be relevant to
protected status, including: (1) whether the group is a minority or
politically powerless,1 89 and (2) whether the characteristic that defines
the members is immutable.' 90 All four factors apply less strictly to quasisuspect class determinations than suspect class ones.191

182. See Ellen Decoo, Changing Attitudes Toward Homosexuality in the United
States from 1977 to 2012 (June 10, 2014) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Brigham Young
University) (on file with the Brigham Young University Scholars Archive).
183. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015).
184.

See JASON PIERCESON, SEXUAL MINORITIES AND POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION

129 (Rowman & Littlefield 2016) (explaining how the rise in support made it easier for
the Court to rationalize the policy in Obergefell).
185. This is likely because transgender civil rights are an emerging area of case law.
See Duaa Eldeib, Transgender Student Rights: Education Department, Courts Not on
Same Page, CHI. TIB. (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/cttransgender-students-legal-questions-met-20151103-story.html.
186. See SHANNON PRICE MINTER, TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 146 (Paisley Currah,
Richard M. Juana & Shannon Price Miller eds., 2006) ("Gender variance is a deep and
recurring theme in gay culture and gay life. . . ."); see also Chryss Cada, Issue of
Transgender Rights Divides Many Gay Activists: TransgenderActivists Seek a Greater
Voice, Bos. GLOBE, Apr. 23, 2000, at A8 ("Saying the transgender movement 'isn't part
of the gay movement is like saying water isn't part of the earth."') (quoting Riki Anne
Wilchins, executive director of GenderPAC).
187. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam).
188. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion);
accordCity of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985).
189. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313-14.
190. See Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986). The significance of the
immutability and political powerlessness factors is uncertain. See Ginger Grimes,
Masking the Reemergence of Immutability with "Outcomes for Children," 5 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 683, 684-85 (2015); William N. Eskridge Jr., Is Political Powerless a
Requirement for Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny?, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 11-12
(2010). However, concerns about these two criteria often arise in LGBT litigation. See,
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First, transgender individualsl 92 have suffered from purposeful
unequal treatment, including discrimination and violence, due to bias
against them.1 93 Second, being transgender bears no relation to one's
ability to perform or contribute to society.
In other words, an
individual's gender identity has no bearing on that person's "ability to
cope with and function in the everyday world." 94
Third, transgender people are generally accepted as a minority
group. 19 5 Fourth, gender identity is an immutable characteristic.' 96 A
trait is "immutable" when the trait exists "solely by the accident of
birth." 19 7 Members of the class are not required to be physically unable
to change the trait, but changing the trait must involve great difficulty,
such as a "major physical change or a traumatic change of identity."1 98
Changing one's gender identity would require a "traumatic change of
identity" because a person's desire to live as a member of the opposite
sex is "deep seated, unavoidable and overwhelming."' 9 9
Therefore, transgender individuals should receive quasi-suspect
status because such individuals experienced a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, transgender status bears no relation to one's ability to

e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir.
1990); Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 6-10 (D.D.C. 1991).
191. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185 (2d Cir. 2012).
192. Although protected status should be afforded to the LGBT community as a
whole, this analysis will focus on transgender individuals for purposes of this Comment.
193.
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6,

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (finding animus towards LGBT people to
be the second-most common motivation for hate crimes); see also JAIME M. GRANT, ET
AL.,

INJUSTICE

AT

EVERY

TURN:

A

REPORT

OF

THE

NATIONAL

TRANSGENDER

DISCRIMINATION SURVEY (2011), http://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/
resources/NTDSReport.pdf (finding that 63 percent of survey participants experienced a
serious act of discrimination that caused job loss, eviction, school bullying, or assault,
due to bias).

194.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (holding

that mentally retarded people have a reduced ability to contribute to society).
195.
See Judith B. Bradford et al., Sexual and Gender Minority Health: What We
Know and What Needs to Be Done, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, 989-95 (June 2008) ("[LGBT[]
persons constitute sexual and gender minorities .... .").

196. See, e.g., Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2000),
overruledon other grounds by Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1187 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that sexual identity is immutable because it is "inherent to one's identity").
197. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion).
198. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989); see also The
Constitutional Status ofSexual Orientation:Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification,

98 HARv. L. REV. 1285, 1303 (1985).
199.

MINTER, supra note 186, at 18 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae Harry Benjamin

International Gender Dysphoria Association 4, Brandon v. Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 604
(Neb. 2001)). See Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093 (concluding that sexual identity
is immutable because it is "inherent to one's identity").
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contribute to society, transgender people are a minority sexual group, and
gender identity is an immutable characteristic. Also, courts' increasing
recognition of the right to express one's identity in the gay rights context
should serve as a stepping stone in creating greater protections for
transgender and LGBT people as a whole.20
Although transgender people meet the criteria for a quasi-suspect
class, the Supreme Court may disfavor the creation of a new suspect
class,201 in which case courts should choose to recognize transgender as
part of the gender classification. Under either avenue, laws that
distinguish transgender individuals based on their transgender status
would only be valid if the laws were substantially related to an important
202
government purpose.
C.

The FederalDistrict Courts That Addressed This Specific Issue
Were Flawed in Their Reasoning
1.

Johnston: Failing to Properly Define "Sex"

Regarding the equal protection claim, the Johnston court held that
the plaintiff, a transgender male, was not discriminated against when he
was banned from using the university's male facilities.203 The court used
the rational basis test because neither the Third Circuit nor the Supreme
Court has held that transgender is a protected characteristic.204 The
Johnston court also did not recognize the plaintiffs claim as gender
discrimination, determining that the word "sex" only encompasses
biological males and females.20 5 This reasoning is flawed on several
grounds.
First, the Johnston court's primary support was Ulane v. Eastern
Airlines, a pre-Price Waterhouse case holding that Title VII affords no
protection to transgender victims of sex discrimination.2 0 6 However,
numerous federal courts recognize that Title VII protects transgender
persons from sex discrimination because, if nothing else, transgender
200. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015) ("The Constitution
promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that
allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.").
201. This could be due to concern with extending protection to too many groups,
growing conservatism of the Court, or a strict interpretation of the elements that is
difficult for classes to meet. Bretrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring PoliticalPower:
Suspect Class Determinationsand the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REv. 323, 325-26 (2016).
202. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
203. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97
F. Supp. 3d 657, 668, 683 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
204. Id. at 668.
205. Id. at 670.
206. Ulane v. E. Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1086-87 (7th Cir. 1984).
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persons fail to comply with stereotypical gender norms.20 7 Therefore,
whether Ulane is reliable law is questionable in light of the Price
Waterhouse jurisprudence, which has set many courts on the opposite
path.208
Also, the Johnston court implied that a gender discrimination claim
brought by the plaintiff as a male, rather than a transgender person,
would only be valid if the plaintiff underwent a physical transformation
from female to male. 20 9 Despite the court's effort to force sex into a
narrow definition based only on genitalia, a transgender individual is
discriminated against because of their sexual identity, regardless of
whether physical surgery has occurred. 2 10 Furthermore, such an opinion
could convince transgender individuals that undergoing costly and unsafe
surgery is the key to obtaining equality and freedom from discrimination,
which would be unjust. 2 1 1
Finally, the Johnston court noted that even if it did apply heightened
scrutiny, the result would be the same because the privacy interest in
segregated bathrooms is substantially related to an important government
interest.212 However, the plaintiffs interest in "performing some of life's
most basic functions . . . in an environment consistent with his male
gender identity" 213 should tip the scales in the plaintiffs favor because
the other students' can maintain their privacy by using private changing
areas.214 Therefore, the court should have applied heightened scrutiny
207. See, e.g., Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 2011); Smith v. City
of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6thCir. 2004); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 120102 (9th Cir. 2000); Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., Inc., 542 F. Supp.
2d 653, 659-61 (S.D. Tex. 2008); Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 211
(D.D.C. 2006); Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, No. 05-243, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6521, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2006).
208. See Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1201-02 (observing that Ulane was overruled by
Price Waterhouse); Smith, 378 F.3d at 573 (stating that the approach in Ulane has been
"eviscerated" by Price Waterhouse).

209.
210.

Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 671.
See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 305 (D.D.C. 2008) (stating that

it was inconsequential whether the discrimination was because the plaintiff was "an
insufficiently masculine man, an insufficiently feminine woman, or an inherently gendernonconforming transsexual" because the sex-stereotyping vehicle provided relief
regardless).
See Jay Zitter, Gender Reassignment or "Sex Change" Surgery as Covered
211.
Procedure Under State Medical Assistance Program, 60 A.L.R. 627 (2010) (mentioning
the dangerous nature of sex-reassignment surgery); Alyssa Jackson, The High Cost of
Being Transgender, CNN, July 31, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/31I/health/
transgender-costs-irpt/ (stating that sex-reassignment surgery can cost more than

$100,000).
212. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 669.
213. Id at 668.
214. See Twp. High Sch. Dist. 211, OCR Case No. 05-14-1055 12 (Dep't of Educ.
Nov. 2, 2015); see also Tobin & Levi, supra note 10, at 301 (arguing that transgender
students have the greater privacy interest in this situation because denying transgender
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and found that the balancing test weighed in favor of the transgender
student.
Regarding the Title IX claim, the Johnston court emphasized that
most federal courts have held that transgender status is not protected
under the statute. 215 However, the court did not address that the EEOC,
interpreting Title VII, and the ED, interpreting Title IX, determined that
"sex" encompasses gender and that these statues prohibit discrimination
based on transgender status. The court also disregarded the ED's letter
stating that transgender students must be treated in accordance with their
gender identity.2 16 Although not binding, these decisions should be given
deference because they are reasonable interpretations by the agencies
that administered the statutes.2 17
To support its Title IX decision, the Johnston court relied on
2 18
Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia,
a case brought by a
non-transgender female who wanted to attend an all-male school.21 9
Such reliance is misplaced because the Vorchheimer plaintiff did not feel
ostracized due to bias against her, but wanted to switch schools as a
matter of personal preference. 220 In contrast, the Johnston plaintiff was
not arguing that every student should be able to access any restroom they
choose. The argument is that transgender students should be able to use
the restroom of the sex with which they identify. 22 1 Furthermore,
reliance on a forty-year-old case is unsound when, as the court notes,
"society's views of gender, gender identity, sex, and sexual orientation
have significantly evolved in recent years."222
The Johnston court then analyzed the Title IX claim under the sexstereotyping theory. 223 The court relied on Third Circuit precedent,
Bibby v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. 2 24 and Prowel v. Wise Business Forms,
Inc.,225 to conclude that the plaintiff was required, and failed, to plead
students access to facilities singles them out and exposes the intimate nature of their
transsexualism) (citing Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1999)).
215. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 674.
216. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, supra note 58; see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) (requiring a court to accept an
agency's statutory construction, even if the agency's reading differs from what the court
believes is the best interpretation).
217. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
218. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), af'd, 403 U.S.
703 (1977).
219. Id. at 881.
220. Id. at 882.
221. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97
F. Supp. 3d 657, 681 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
222. Id. at 668.
223. Id. at 680.
224. Bibby v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001).
225. Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009).
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discrimination based on how he looked, acted, or spoke.226 However,
reliance on these cases is misplaced because Bibby and Prowel were
cases concerning sexual orientation.227 More persuasive authority is
Glenn v. Brumby and Smith v. City of Salem, which found that gender
stereotyping is the same as discrimination against someone for being a
transgender person. 228 Although Glenn and Smith are not binding on the
Johnston court, they are more persuasive because they involve claims
based on gender identity.2 29
Finally, the Johnston court reasoned that Title IX was enacted with
the categories of men and women in mind. 23 0 However, many laws have
been created with one group of people in mind, but apply to protect
various others as well. 23 ' For example, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services,232 the Supreme Court held that same-sex harassment is sex
discrimination under Title VII. 233 Justice Scalia noted:
[While same-sex harassment was] assuredly not the principal evil
Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII . . statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil [they were passed to
combat] to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our
legislators by which we are governed. 234
Thus, even if an insufficient complaint precluded the sexstereotyping theory, the Johnston court should have recognized the
transgender claim as valid sex discrimination per se under Title IX.
226. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 680.
227. See Bibby, 260 F.3d at 264 (holding that a gay man failed to state a harassment
claim because he could not prove sex-stereotyping); Prowel, 579 F.3d at 292 (holding
that a gay man could submit his gender stereotyping claim to the jury in an attempt prove
sex discrimination).
228. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of
Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2004).
229. The distinction between cases involving sexual orientation and cases involving
gender identity is important because the latter lends itself to the reasoning in Glenn and
Smith that transgender discrimination is sex stereotyping, while the same may not be true
for sexual orientation discrimination. See Refusal to Hire Homosexual, EEOC Dec. No.
76-67, P 6493, at 4263 (stating that sexual orientation is "in no way synonymous" with
sex and gender).
230. Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 677.
231. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1872) ("Undoubtedly while
negro slavery alone was in the minds of Congress when it passed the [T]hirteenth
[Amendment}. .. [w]e do not say that no one else . . can share in this protection.");
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (explaining that the central purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause was the "prevention of official conduct discriminating on the
basis of race" at one point).
232. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
233. Id. at 82.
234. Id. at 79.
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Therefore, the Johnston court should not have dismissed the
plaintiffs claims because the court, relying on outdated and factually
dissimilar cases, failed to properly define sex as encompassing gender.
Even if the court was not prepared to recognize transgender as a suspect
class, the court should have allowed the plaintiff to recover under the sex
discrimination theory and upheld both the Equal Protection and Title IX
claims.
Gloucester: Failing
2.
Interpretation

to

Give

Deference

to the

ED's

The Gloucester district court dismissed the plaintiff student's Title
IX claim, 23 5 referring to his struggles in school as "unsubstantiated
claims of hardship," and his view on student privacy as a "self-serving
assertion."236
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged this decision's
unsoundness in their reversal. 237 The lower court's reasoning was flawed
because it ignored the ED's interpretation of its own Title IX regulation,
which was issued in a letter stating that schools must treat transgender
students consistent with their gender identity.2 38
An agency's interpretation of its own regulation is given controlling
weight if: (1) the regulation is ambiguous, and (2) the interpretation is
not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. 2 39 Although the
district court argued that the regulation is not ambiguous because it
allows for bathrooms to be separated according to se240 the regulation is
ambiguous regarding whether a transgender student should be treated as
male or female for purposes of bathroom access. 241 The regulation could
be interpreted to mean that bathroom access is based on a student's
242
biological sex, or to mean that access is based on gender identity.
Secondly, the ED's interpretation is not erroneous or inconsistent
because, according to the Fourth Circuit, sex is not just biological; there
are different "physical, psychological, and social aspects" included in the
term "sex." 243 Also, the ED's letter still supports the original Title IX
235. Although the court also erroneously dismissed the equal protection claim, this
claim was not analyzed by the court. See G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 132 F. Supp.
3d 736, 747 (E.D. Va. 2015).
236. Gloucester, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 751-52.
237. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 719-23 (4th Cir. 2016).
238. See Ferg-Cadima,supra note 132.
239. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-63 (1997).
240. Gloucester, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 746.
241. Gloucester, 822 F.3d at 720-21.
242. Id. The Fourth Circuit also stated that the regulation is ambiguous regarding
other situations, such as which restroom students who are transsexual, intersex, or who
lost their genitalia in an accident would use. Id.
243. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 722 (4th Cir. 2016).
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regulation and the continued practice of having sex-segregated
facilities.2 44 Contrary to the district court's interpretation that the letter
requires bathrooms to be separated only by gender identity,245 the letter
simply states that transgender students must be treated consistent with
their gender identity. 246 Thus, bathrooms will still be sex-segregated for
the majority of students, with an exception for transgender students.
Finally, the argument that following the ED's letter would degrade
the federal government's system of checks and balances247 is speculative.
The Supreme Court has determined that agency interpretations, even
those in letters, can be controlling when the above requirements are
met. 248 Regardless, the ED, not the courts, is in the best position to
interpret the regulation, 24 9 and the ED interpreted the regulation using
fair and considered judgment. 25 0 Therefore, the district court should have
given deference to the ED's interpretation and recognized the student's
Title IX claim as valid.25 1
D.

A QuestionableSolution: The ED's Decision in OCR Case No. 0514-1055

In determining if discrimination exists, the Education Department's
Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") determines if there are "any apparent
differences in the treatment of similarly-situated individuals."252 When
OCR completed the investigation of Township High School District 211,
OCR found that the transgender student was treated unfairly by being
required to use a private restroom to change for gym class and sports.253
Also, the ED suggested that having the transgender student use private
changing curtains would not suffice if the student did not consent to
using them. 25 4 Therefore, the ED takes the position that transgender

244. See Ferg-Cadima, supra note 132.
245. Gloucester, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 746.
246. See Ferg-Cadima, supra note 132.
247. Gloucester, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 747.
248. Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000).
249. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 856-66
(1984) (explaining that filling gaps where ambiguities exist involves difficult policy
choices that agencies are better equipped to make).
250. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 722 (4th Cir. 2016) (stating that
"novelty is not a reason to refuse deference" and that the interpretation is not "merely a
convenient litigating position" or a "post hoc rationalization").
251. See id.
252. Twp. High Sch. Dist. 211, OCR Case No. 05-14-1055 10 (Dep't of Educ. Nov.
2, 2015).
253. Id.
254. See id.
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students must be able to enter and freely change in the locker room that
corresponds with their gender identity.2 55
The school's, in its defense, explained that its decision to prohibit
the transgender student from entering the women's locker room, and,
later, to require her to change behind a curtain, was based on the other
students' privacy needs.2 56 The school believed that female students
would feel uncomfortable undressing in front of a biological male and
seeing a person who is biologically male undress. 57 The OCR's solution
was that any student wishing to prevent their body from exposure could
change behind a curtain.258
However, it is uncertain whether curtains are really the solution to
this issue. Forcing a transgender student to change in a separate
bathroom or behind a curtain is unfair.2 59 Instead, the ED suggests that
the non-transgender students should change behind curtains. 2 60 Not only
does this also seem unfair, but what might happen next presents an issue.
When the transgender student feels ostracized because that student is the
only one not changing behind a curtain, the student will desire to change
behind a curtain too, at which point the majority of students may decide
they no longer need to. The pattern continues because no matter how
much the transgender student strives for equality, the student is viewed
as inherently different.261
IV. RECOMMENDATION FOR PROTECTING TRANSGENDER STUDENTS
So what can be done to ensure that transgender students are treated
as equally as possible? Bathrooms and locker rooms should no longer be
separated according to sex, but rather, be gender-neutral with equal

255. See id. Families in the Township High School District recently challenged this
decision by suing the school district, the ED, and the Justice Department. See Complaint
at 2, Students & Parents for Privacy v. United States Dep't of Educ., No. 16 C 4945,
(N.D. Ill. 2016).
256. OCR Case No. 05-14-1055, at 11.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 12.
259. See id
260. Id.
261. This pattern is common among those who harbor prejudice. Dr. Seuss once
wrote a tale about yellow creatures called Sneetches, some who have "bellies with stars,"
and others who have "none upon thars [sic]." DR. SUESs, THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER

STORIES 2 (1916). The star-bellied Sneetches discriminate against the plain-bellied
Sneetches, so the plain-bellied Sneetches use McBean's "star-on" machine. Id at 8-9.
The original star-bellied Sneetches get angry, so they use McBean's "star-off' machine.
Id. The pattern escalates and chaos breaks out. Id. at 23. While this story ends with the
Sneetches learning that "no kind of Sneetch is the best on the beaches" and that they can
get along despite their differences, real-life society is not always as sophisticated. Id. at
23.
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access available to everyone.262 To protect privacy, schools should
institute a policy that all students must change behind a privacy curtain
and use single stall toilets, and the ED should actively enforce this
approach nationwide.
Schools should also consider privacy
enhancements such as installing flaps to cover the gaps between the stall
door and wall.263 If schools are uncomfortable with the comingling of
men and women, another solution is to install single-person, unisex
bathrooms and changing rooms.26
Although the ED allows for separate bathrooms and locker rooms
for different sexes, such a system no longer seems adequate. Before
now, no one would have questioned the inherent inequality in separate
restrooms. Today, however, the "separate but equal" doctrine 2 6 5 is
before us once again and is calling Title IX recipients to action. Thus, in
order to achieve the highest level of equality for transgender students,
while simultaneously protecting privacy interests, bathrooms and
changing areas should be for single users and no longer labeled
according to sex.
V.

CONCLUSION

Transgender students are subject to unfair discrimination for
expressing their identities and must be provided a remedy. In accordance
with Title VII case law, EEOC and ED decisions, and the Fourth Circuit
in Gloucester, transgender students should be protected from sex
discrimination under Title IX. Similarly, the reasoning in Glenn and
Smith, gay rights case law, and the characteristics of transgender persons
as a class demonstrate that transgender persons should be protected from
sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause as part of the
gender class or the LGBT class.
Schools and universities should replace their facilities with singleuser restrooms and changing areas that are not labeled according to sex.
When transgender students face sex discrimination at school, courts
should refrain from using the flawed Johnston and Gloucester reasoning,

262. See Jennifer Levi & Daniel Redman, The Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom
Equality, 34 SEATILE U. L. REv. 133 (2010) (discussing the problems with segregated
bathrooms).
263. Restroom Access for Transgender Employees, THE HuMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/resources/restroom-access-for-transgender-employees.
264. Although this solution is more costly, if done correctly, these structures can be
less expensive to construct than multiple-user bathrooms. See Emily Peck, We Don 't
Need SeparateBathroomsfor Men and Women, THE HUFFINGTON PosT, March 31, 2016,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/gender-neutralbathrooms us 56fd6ccbe4b083f5c607262c.
265. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1986).
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and recognize the validity of the transgender students' claims in
accordance with society's evolving views on gender identity.
This is about the dignity and respect we accord our fellow citizens []
and the laws that we ... have enacted to protect them ... [and] what
we must never do [] is turn on our neighbors, our family members,
our fellow Americans for something they cannot control, and deny
what makes them human. 266

It is time for courts to set a precedent in this fight against
discrimination and vindicate transgender students by holding that they
are protected per se under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause.

266. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Justice Department Files Complaint
Against the State of North Carolina to Stop Discrimination Against Transgender
Individuals (May 9, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-filescomplaint-against-state-north-carolina-stop-discrimination-against
(quoting
U.S.
Attorney General Loretta Lynch).

